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UK Law and International Commercial Surrogacy:
‘the very antithesis of sensible’
Emily Jackson*
London School of Economics
Abstract
This article evaluates possible responses to the increased frequency
with which UK couples and individuals travel overseas in order to access commercial
surrogacy arrangements. It concludes that the ban on commercial involvement in
surrogacy arrangements within the UK, and the criteria that must be satisfied before
legal parentage can be transferred to the intended parents, do not promote the best
interests of children, surrogates and intended parents. By facilitating some oversight
of surrogacy before the child is conceived, pre-birth approval for parental orders coupled
with greater professional involvement in surrogacy, would not only better meet the
needs of all parties, but would represent a more sensible, efficient and effective way to
regulate surrogacy.
Introduction
Since the first international surrogacy case reached the High
Court in 2008,1 there has been a steady stream of cases in which UK intended
parents (IPs) have sought to formalise their legal relationships with children
born as a result of international commercial surrogacy arrangements. A Cafcass2
study calculated that, of the 189 parental order applications that year, approxim-
ately 40% had involved international surrogacy.3 While this gives an indication
of howmanyUK citizens travel overseas each year for the purposes of surrogacy,
because not all IPs apply for parental orders, exact numbers are unknowable.
If it is becoming more common for UK citizens to travel in order to access
commercial surrogacy in other countries, how should UK law respond? Since
third party involvement in commercial surrogacy is a criminal offence in the
UK, should mechanisms be put in place to deter UK citizens from using com-
mercial surrogacy agencies overseas? Alternatively, should the status quo be
DOI 10.7590/221354016X14803383336806*
Re X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam).1
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service.2
According to the Cafcass study, there was a total 189 parental order applications in 2013-14;
Cafcass then analysed in detail a random sample of 79 of these, of which 32 had involved in-
3
ternational surrogacy. Cafcass, Cafcass Study of Parental Order Applications made in 2013/14
(Cafcass, 2015). However, it is likely that these numbers underrepresent the true numbers of
people travelling for surrogacy: see N. Gamble/H. Prosser, this issue, at p. 257.
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regarded more positively, as a ‘safety valve’ which enables the UK to prevent
the development of a surrogacy industry, while allowing those citizens who
want to engage in commercial surrogacy to do so relatively easily? If people
travel because they are unable to find a surrogate in the UK, should attempts
be made to make surrogacy in the UK easier or more attractive? Should efforts
instead be directed to some sort of cross-national regulation in order to protect
the interests of surrogates, egg donors, children and intended parents?4 Might
it bemore realistic simply to provide information to people considering travelling
overseas, so that they at least are able to understand the risks and to make in-
formed choices?
As I shall explain below, there are multiple reasons why the extra-territorial
criminalisation of commercial surrogacy would be ineffective and counter-
productive. An increase in the number of women volunteering to become sur-
rogatemothers in theUKmight help to reduce the excess demand for surrogacy,
but it is unlikely to eliminate it. International regulation would have clear ben-
efits, but it might be difficult to achieve and could also push the international
market in surrogacy underground. Good information is clearly necessary in
order that IPs understand the legal and medical risks involved in international
surrogacy, but in practice,many people self-refer to overseas clinics and agencies,
whose staff cannot be expected to have a thorough understanding of British
law on citizenship and parentage.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to ensure that people contemplating
travelling overseas for surrogacy are first provided with accurate information
would be to give them an incentive to make contact with local healthcare pro-
viders before they travel. At a minimum, this could involve ‘shared care’, so
that IPs first receive preliminary investigations and advice at a local regulated
fertility clinic. This could help to ensure that people know what treatments are
appropriate for them before they travel. It could also provide an opportunity to
inform them about the legal pitfalls of international surrogacy, and themedical
risks to surrogates from, for example, multiple embryo transfer. A more
powerful incentive to go through an official information-giving and screening
process at home before people travel abroad for surrogacy might involve pre-
conception authorisation for a parental order, so that the IPs could be recognised
as the child’s legal parents from birth. In what follows, I evaluate possible re-
sponses to the growth in international commercial surrogacy, before concluding
that the case for reform of the law relating to surrogacy in the UK is now over-
whelming.
See Rogerson, this issue, at p. 275.4
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Prohibition
Many countries prohibit, or try to discourage commercial
surrogacy. Most draconian, perhaps, is the extra-territorial criminalisation of
involvement in commercial surrogacy. Residents of New South Wales in Aus-
tralia, for example, commit a criminal offence if they travel anywhere in the
world for commercial surrogacy. In practice, however, no one has been convicted
of this offence, which is, in any event, easy to avoid simply by acquiring a postal
address in neighbouring Victoria, from where it is not an offence to travel for
commercial surrogacy.
Because commercial surrogacy generally results in the birth of a child whom
the surrogate does not want to keep, the need to protect the welfare of the child
will often mean that legal systems which ostensibly ban commercial surrogacy
have no option other than to facilitate the child’s return ‘home’ with her parents.
In Canada, for example, commercial surrogacy is a criminal offence, punishable
by up to ten years in prison, but at the same time, there are clear guidelines to
facilitate the acquisition of Canadian citizenship by children born as a result of
overseas commercial surrogacy arrangements.5 Citizenship will be granted
provided that the IPs can provide evidence of a genetic link with the child, the
child’s birth certificate, proof of payment of hospital bills and a copy of the
contractual agreements with the clinic and the surrogate mother.6
A different but undoubtedly also draconian response to international surro-
gacy is to fail to have any mechanism through which the IPs can become the
child’s legal parents. This used to be the case in France, until, in 2011,France’s
failure to recognise two children’s relationships with their intended fathers, to
whom they were biological related, was held by the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), to interfere with the children’s
Article 8 rights.7 Then in 2015, the French Cour de Cassation decided two cases
involving Frenchmenwho had entered into surrogacy arrangements in Russia.8
The Court held that ‘Surrogate motherhood alone cannot justify the refusal to
transcribe into French birth registers the foreign birth certificate of a child who
has one French parent’, thus allowing the names of the intended father and
the surrogate to appear on the French birth register. It is not possible for the
K. Lozanski, ‘Transnational surrogacy: Canada's contradictions’, Social Science & Medicine 124
(2015), 383-390.
5
Ibid.6
Mennesson v. France (Application no. 65192/11) and Labassee v. France (Application no. 65941/11),
26 June 2014.
7
Cour de Cassation, Rulings on the transcription into French birth registers of children born
abroad of a surrogate mother, 3 July 2015.
8
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name of the child’s intended mother or, in the case of gay male couples, the
intended second father to appear on the register, and surrogacy continues to
be illegal in France, punishable, in theory at least, by up to six months in prison.
In the UK, it is an offence for anyone other than the surrogate and the IPs
to facilitate or negotiate a surrogacy arrangement ‘on a commercial basis’. In
practice, thismeans that reputable organisations like COTS, Surrogacy UK and
Brilliant Beginnings, which help to put IPs and surrogate mothers in touch
with each other, must do so on a ‘not for profit’ basis.9 It is also an offence to
advertise a willingness to participate in or facilitate surrogacy arrangements,
or to publish such advertisements. In practice, however, there has never been
a prosecution and, as Natalie Gamble has explained: ‘Just a few clicks on Google
will uncoverUK prospective parents and surrogates connecting with each other
on busy online surrogacy forums and social networking pages’.10
Surrogates and IPs who enter into commercial arrangements with each
other do not commit an offence, but one of the conditions thatmust be satisfied
before a parental order can be granted is that: ‘The court must be satisfied that
no money or other benefit (other than for expenses reasonably incurred) has
been given or received … unless authorised by the court’.11 In practice, however,
court authorisation of payments significantly greater than ‘expenses reasonably
incurred’ has become routine. Because the child’s welfare throughout her life
is the court’s paramount consideration when deciding whether to make a par-
ental order, the courts are usually presented with a fait accompli. If the child’s
settled home is with her IPs, a parental order will be in her best interests, and
payments in excess of expenses will be authorised.
In most cases, the court will simply set out the payments made in excess of
expenses, before asking a series of questions about them, described by Theis
J. in Re P-M as a ‘well-trodden path’: 12
i. Was the sum paid disproportionate to reasonable expenses?
ii. Were the applicants acting in good faith and without moral taint in their
dealings with the surrogate mother?
iii. Were the applicants party to any attempt to defraud the authorities?
Having invariably answered ‘no’ to all of these questions, the court then
turns to the paramountcy of the child’s welfare throughout her life, and, as
For more detail on the operation of these surrogacy organisations, see K. Cotton; N. Smith;
N. Gamble/H. Prosser, this issue, at pp. 229, 237 and 257, respectively.
9
N. Gamble, ‘A better framework for United Kingdom surrogacy’, in S. Golombok et al. (eds.),
Regulating Reproductive Donation (Cambridge UP, 2016), 140-162, 141.
10
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s. 54.11
[2013] EWHC 2328 (Fam) at para. [20].12
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Theis J. put it in Re P-M, ‘where the welfare considerations demand that an
order should be made, the court will only in the clearest case of abuse of public
policy consider not making an order’.13
Although the courts have left open the possibility of refusing to grant an
order where there has been ‘a clear abuse of public policy’, this has never
happened in practice. We therefore do not know when, if ever, an abuse of
public policy might be so clear or grave that it would take priority over child
welfare considerations. We do, however, know that making unwitting misrep-
resentations to a court andmaking an unlawful payment to a surrogate mother
is insufficient. In ReW,14 a British couple had entered into a surrogacy arrange-
ment with a commercial surrogacy agency in California. They were matched
with a surrogate in Nevada, to whom they had paid $38,500, in addition to her
expenses, as well as giving her gifts valued at $2,093 (they had also paid $22,000
to the surrogacy agency). The payment to the surrogate was not only significant,
it was also unlawful in Nevada, and documents filed in a Nevada court had
wrongly stated that no compensation had been paid.
Against this, Theis J. held that the IPs had acted in good faith; there was no
‘moral taint’ in the dealings between them and the surrogate;15 and the payments
did not represent ‘an inducement to enter into this arrangement in a way that
her will may have been overborne’.16 It was also ‘not outside the amounts that
have been paid in other similar cases involving US surrogacy arrangements’.17
Theis J. therefore found that the payments were not an abuse of public policy;
she duly authorised them, and a parental order was made.
In addition to facilitating legal parenthood through the making of parental
orders, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has issued detailed
guidance on how to apply for British citizenship for children born overseas as
a result of international commercial surrogacy arrangements.18 The rules are
complicated, and the processes differ according to whether the surrogate is
married, and whether the genetic father is a British citizen otherwise than by
descent.19 When launching their latest guidance, the FCO’s Children’s Policy
At para. [19].13
[2013] EWHC 3570 (Fam).14
At para. [26].15
At para. [27].16
At para. [27].17
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Surrogacy Overseas (FCO, 2014).18
That is, he is a British citizen by virtue of birth, adoption, registration or naturalisation in the
United Kingdom. British citizens by descent, that is people who were born overseas to a British
parent, do not automatically transfer their British citizenship to their children born overseas.
19
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Adviser said that it was important to warn parents that ‘the legal processes
around international surrogacy are complicated and the procedure for getting
passports and confirming nationality for the child can be complex and take a
long time’.20 The purpose of the FCO guidance was to ‘inform prospective
parents about what to expect right from the outset – so that they are prepared,
get the right advice and they don’t run into unexpected difficulties’.21
Throughout the world, therefore, it is common for domestic prohibitions
of commercial surrogacy to be easily avoided by travelling overseas, and for
courts and immigration services to have no option but to facilitate the acquisition
of parenthood and citizenship. There are commentators who object to this de
facto tolerance of international commercial surrogacy. Kristin Lozanski, for
example, maintains that it is ‘grossly inconsistent’ to prohibit commercial sur-
rogacy within Canada, while positively enabling it outside of Canada’s borders.22
If, as Lozanski argues, the reasons for prohibiting commercial surrogacy are
concerns about the ‘commodification of bodies’ and ‘gender inequality’, it would
be peculiar if these concerns stopped at the Canadian border. As a result, she
claims that ‘Health Canada would thus be more accurate in stating that “the
commercial trade and abuse of the reproductive capabilities of [Canadian]
children, [Canadian] women, and [Canadian] men is, for health and ethical
reasons, a crime [in Canada, though not elsewhere]”’.23
In practice, however, is hard to see how the law could do anything other
than tolerate the bypassing of domestic prohibitions of commercial surrogacy.
It would be impossible to stop people travelling,24 and once a child is born, the
principal concern for any court must be to protect her best interests, which will
invariably not be served by punishing her parents by criminalising them, or
preventing them from acquiring legal parenthood. Indeed, this was the view of
the Warnock Inquiry in 1984. Despite the Committee’s view that there should
be legislation to criminalise the operation of surrogacy agencies, its report was
clear that ‘We do not envisage that this legislation would render private persons
entering into surrogacy arrangements liable to criminal prosecution, as we are
FCO Press Release, ‘Before considering surrogacy overseas do your research, advises FCO’,
www.gov.uk/government/news/before-considering-surrogacy-overseas-do-your-research-advises-
fco (accessed 28 June 2016).
20
Ibid.21
K. Lozanski, ‘Transnational surrogacy: Canada's contradictions’, Social Science & Medicine 124
(2015), 383-390. See also I Glenn Cohen, Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law and
Ethics (Oxford UP, 2014).
22
Lozanski, ibid., 383-390.23
L. Culley et al., ‘“What are you going to do, confiscate their passports?” Professional perspectives
on cross-border reproductive travel’, Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 31 (2013), 46-
57.
24
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anxious to avoid children being born tomothers subject to the taint of criminal-
ity’.25
Although commercial surrogacy is, in theory, prohibited in the UK, in
practice, UK citizens can engage in commercial surrogacy abroad or at home
without facing any sanction at all. The prohibition on commercial surrogacy is
therefore almost completely ineffective, biting only on the operation of for-profit
surrogacy agencies. In practice, then, the ban on commercial surrogacy may
simply place obstacles in the way of surrogate mothers and IPs obtaining pro-
fessional support and advice.
The status quo as a ‘safety valve’
Although some might argue that it is incoherent to prohibit
commercial surrogacy while facilitating the acquisition of legal parenthood for
IPs whose childrenwere conceived through international commercial surrogacy
arrangements, others have suggested that this could be regardedmore positively,
as a ‘safety valve’. Guido Pennings, for example, has argued that the tolerance
of citizens avoiding restrictive laws by travelling overseas ‘shows a healthy degree
of relativism’.26 Blocking the treatment of minority groups would, according
to Pennings, be ‘dangerous, as it could increase feelings of frustration, suppres-
sion and indignation’. Instead, reproductive travel is a ‘safety valve that avoids
moral conflict, and as such, contributes to a peaceful coexistence of different
ethical and religious views in Europe’.27
Pennings et al. have suggested that if it becomes common for people to
travel in order to avoid legal restrictions, it could amount to a ‘form of civil
disobedience’ which exerts pressure on their home government to change the
law.28 Pressure on the ‘safety valve’ function of international commercial surro-
gacy might also come from the surrogates’ home countries. Within the past
few years, more and more low and middle income countries have closed their
doors to international surrogacy arrangements. It is no longer possible for for-
eigners to enter into surrogacy arrangements in Thailand, Nepal and India.
Mexico briefly appeared to be an attractive alternative destination, but in 2016,
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HMSO: London,
1984), para. 8.19.
25
G. Pennings, ‘Legal harmonization and reproductive tourism in Europe’,Human Reproduction
19 (2004), 2689-2694.
26
Ibid.27
G. Pennings et al., ‘ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 15: Cross-border reproductive care’,
Human Reproduction 23 (2008), 2182-2184.
28
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Mexico too changed its laws and IPsmust now beMexican citizens. As a result,
Mexican clinics have entered into arrangements with US surrogacy agencies
so that the IVF procedure takes place more cheaply in Mexico, before the US
surrogate returns to the US for the remainder of her pregnancy.
For the time being, foreigners are still able to engage in surrogacy arrange-
ments in a number of countries, including Canada, the Ukraine, Russia,
Georgia, Cambodia and Greece. And international commercial surrogacy will
undoubtedly continue to be available, at a high price, in theUS. But given rapidly
changing laws, international commercial surrogacy’s capacity to act as a ‘safety
valve’ is undoubtedly unstable, and if the US becomes the only possible desti-
nation, it will be prohibitively expensive for all but the wealthiest IPs.
Self-sufficiency
A different response to international commercial surrogacy
might be for individual nation states to strive to become self-sufficient in surro-
gacy services.29 If people could more easily access surrogacy arrangements
locally, demand for international commercial arrangements might be likely to
dwindle.30 This could also benefit those who cannot afford to travel, and might
also reduce the risk of exploitation of foreign surrogates.
It is, however, unclear whether there are, in fact, enough women in the UK
who would be willing to act as surrogates for all of the IPs who currently travel
overseas for surrogacy. Certainly, the evidence from the UK organisations that
match IPs and surrogates is that there are more would-be IPs than there are
would-be surrogates. At the time of writing, Surrogacy UK’s website explains
that it is not taking on any new IPs, because of a shortage of available surrogates:
‘We are currently not taking IP applications. As an organisation we like to
maintain a surrogate to intended parent ratio of 1:3 and at present it stands at
1:5. We are continually reviewing the ratios.’31
Of course, it is possible that the availability of surrogates in the UK might
increase if commercial surrogacy were allowed, although this is not the view
G.K.D. Crozier and D. Martin, ‘How to address the ethics of reproductive travel to developing
countries: A comparison of national self-sufficiency and regulated market approaches’,
Developing World Bioethics 12 (2012), 45-54.
29
K. Horsey and S. Sheldon, ‘Still Hazy After All These Years: The Law Regulating Surrogacy’,
Medical Law Review 20 (2012), 67-89.
30
www.surrogacyuk.org/intended_parents/joining-surrogacy-uk (accessed 21 October 2016).31
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of the Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy Law Reform, whose report
suggests that commercial surrogacy is ‘largely unsupported among those who
have experienced surrogacy first hand’.32
It is also possible that changes to the law to enable the IPs to be recognised
as the child’s legal parents from birthmight encouragemore women to consider
surrogacy. There is some evidence that British surrogates resent the requirement
that their name should appear on the child’s birth certificate.33Decriminalising
advertising might help to raise awareness of surrogacy and ‘normalising’ it by
publicising accounts of surrogacy arrangements that have worked well might
also help. Inevitably, there tends to be considerable media interest in the small
minority of arrangements that goes wrong. For example, a distressing recent
case,34 involving a surrogate with learning difficulties, gave rise to some predict-
ably grim headlines, like this from theMail on Sunday: ‘Surrogate mother who
agreed to give birth to a baby for a gay couple she met in Burger King wins
custody of the boy after judge finds she was “manipulated and exploited”’.35 Of
course, it could be argued that this case, where the parties found each other on
a Facebook forum, offers powerful support for the regulation of surrogacy and
for routine professional involvement in surrogacy arrangements. Ironically,
then, the UK’s ban on commercial involvement in surrogacy does not stop
payments, but it doesmake this sort of ill-advised Facebook arrangementmore,
rather than less likely.
Although it might be assumed that commercial surrogacy would involve
much greater payments to surrogates than are already permitted as ‘expenses’,
this is not necessarily the case. In their recent study, the Surrogacy UKWorking
Group found that more than two-thirds (68.2%) of UK-based surrogates were
paid between £10,000-15,000 in expenses, with 27.1% receiving less than
£10,000 and 4.7% receiving £15,000-£20,000.36 Their survey also included 16
IPs who had had children through surrogacy overseas, in which the mean sum
paid to the surrogate was £17,375. This is not dramatically different from the
‘going rate’ for expenses in the UK. Of course, this average includes IPs who
had entered into surrogacy arrangements in India, where surrogates receive
significantly less than in the US. Nevertheless, in two of the most recent High
Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy Law Reform, Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting
and Reform (Surrogacy UK, 2015), para. 5.2.
32
See, for example, V. Jadva, ‘Surrogacy: issues, concerns and complexities’, in Susan Golombok
et al. (eds.), Regulating Reproductive Donation (Cambridge UP, 2016), 126-139; and K. Horsey,
33
Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting and Reform (Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy
Law Reform, 2015).
A & B v. X & Z (A Child by his guardian) [2016] EWFC 34.34
Jo MacFarlane/Polly Dunbar,Mail on Sunday (3 July 2016).35
Surrogacy UK Working Group on Surrogacy Law Reform, Surrogacy in the UK: Myth busting
and Reform (Surrogacy UK, 2015), para. 3.1.
36
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Court cases involving US surrogate mothers, the amounts paid varied from
£12,850 and £14,37537 to $33,737.10.38
In Surrogacy UK’s survey, the main expense for IPs who had entered into
surrogacy arrangements overseas were the additional costs of medical fees (on
average, £26,281.25), travel and accommodation (£8,781.25), and legal and
other fees (£14,000). These fees are not, in fact, much more than cost of the
bespoke ‘matching service’ offered on a not-for-profit basis in theUK by Brilliant
Beginnings. For UK surrogacy, an initial options review meeting with Brilliant
Beginnings costs £500 plus VAT, with the full service costing £12,000 plus
VAT.39 Surrogacy UK’s and COTS’ fees are lower. Nevertheless, it is clear that
a non-commercial surrogacy arrangement in the UK can cost as much as
£35,000. If substantial sums of money are able to change hands in non-com-
mercial surrogacy, the ban on commercial surrogacy looks rather weak and in-
effective.
International Regulation
All international surrogacy involves at least one overseas pa-
tient: the surrogate and, in arrangementsmade by gay and singlemen, or where
the female intended parent cannot use her own eggs, they will also involve the
treatment of an egg donor. These women are assuming the risks, discomforts
and inconveniences of fertility treatment and/or pregnancy for the benefit of
others. As patients, their care should be the first concern of the medical profes-
sionals involved in their care, and their rights as patients should be protected
and respected by those who commission their services. One of the most troub-
ling features of international surrogacy is the concern that this has not always
been the case.
Evidence from India suggests that, in some surrogacy cases, there has been
a complete absence of informed consent. Rudrappa and Collins interviewed 70
Indian surrogates in Bangalore, and found that none of them had been told
what kinds of medical interventions they would undergo; they had not received
any information about the risks of ovarian stimulation; most of them were not
told that they would deliver through caesarean section at weeks 36-38 and none
had received any postnatal care from the agencies that hired them.40
A, B v. C, D [2016] EWFC 42.37
Re Z (A Child) [2015] EWFC 73.38
www.brilliantbeginnings.co.uk/intended-parents/brilliant-beginnings-fees (accessed 21 October
2016).
39
S. Rudrappa/C. Collins, ‘Altruistic Agencies and Compassionate Consumers: Moral Framing
of Transnational Surrogacy’, Gender and Society 29 (2015), 937-959.
40
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Regardless of nationality, egg donors and surrogates have the same rights
as any other patients to make decisions about their medical care. Contractual
terms that purport to take away those rights – perhaps by specifying that an
abortion will take place if a fetal abnormality is detected – are oppressive and
should be automatically struck out of contracts, in the same way as unfair con-
tract terms are deleted from other contracts. While contractual terms which
specify that termination will take place in certain circumstances are unenforce-
able and oppressive, it is nevertheless sensible for surrogates and intended
parents to discuss their attitudes towards, for example, termination and delivery
method, as well as post-birth contact, before entering into an agreement with
each other. Of course, a surrogate who initially believes that she would be happy
to deliver by caesarean section must retain the right to change her mind, but
agreements are more likely to go smoothly when parties’ expectations are dis-
cussed openly before they make a decision to proceed. In countries where it is
not routine for intended parents and surrogates tomeet before conception, and
where there are language barriers even if they do meet, it will be harder for the
parties to a surrogacy agreement to make sure that they have a shared under-
standing of how they are going to navigate their relationship, both during the
pregnancy and after the child is born.
As a result of concerns that the rights and interests of surrogates are not
always properly safeguarded in commercial surrogacy arrangements in low and
middle income countries, it has been suggested that some form of cross-border
regulation should be attempted.41 In practice, international regulation might
most plausibly be effected by an international instrument akin to the Hague
Conventions on inter-country adoption and child abduction. To this end, the
Hague Conference on Private International Law has recently taken up the issue
of international surrogacy arrangements.42 While it identified ‘the need to
eliminate “limping” legal parentage and statelessness’ as themost immediately
pressing issue, other important issues were:
‘the need to ensure surrogate mothers’ free and informed consent to ISAs
[international surrogacy arrangements]; the need to ensure appropriate standards
of medical care for surrogate mothers and children, including ensuring the
surrogate mother’s ability to retain decision-making over her own body; the
need for some minimum checks concerning the intending parents’ suitability
See also Rogerson, this issue, at p. 275.41
Hague Conference on Private International Law Council on General Affairs and Policy of the
Conference: Conclusions and Recommendations (HCCH, 2015).
42
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to enter into the arrangement, and the need to establish standards concerning
the child’s right to know his/her genetic and birth origins.’43
Minimum standards for surrogacy might include a requirement that the
contract must be in a language that the surrogate can understand, and that it
must not include oppressive terms which seek to take away the pregnant
woman’s right to make decisions about her medical care. Of course, global
minimum standards would be difficult to enforce, but a Hague Convention on
International Surrogacy would send a clear signal about acceptable and unac-
ceptable features of international commercial surrogacy.44
Education
Adopting a ‘harm reduction’ approach, similar to that invoked
in relation to drug use and prostitution in the light of the AIDS pandemic, if
people are going to travel overseas in order to access surrogacy arrangements,
regardless of what the law says or does, the emphasis should instead be upon
trying to make this as safe as possible. In relation to cross-border reproductive
care more generally, the counsellors and patient support group representatives
interviewed by Culley et al. thought the only feasible response to reproductive
travel is to educate people, and ensure that ‘they go into it with their eyes open
and fully aware of the implications’.
If all IPs attended licensed clinics in the UK before making their surrogacy
arrangements overseas, it would be possible for them to be well informed about
the questions they need to ask, the safety risks to the surrogate and egg donor,
and the implications of UK citizenship and parentage laws. In practice, however,
it is the internet, rather than domestic healthcare professionals, to which people
turn when seeking out information about international commercial surrogacy.45
Clinics’ and agencies’ websites now specifically target foreigners by offering
Skype consultations and help with travel and accommodation, but equally im-
Hague Conference on Private International Law The Desirability and Feasibility of Further Work
on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project (HCCH, 2014).
43
See also C. Humbyrd, ‘Fair trade international surrogacy’,DevelopingWorld Bioethics 9 (2009),
111-18.
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E. Blyth, ‘Fertility patients’ experiences of cross-border reproductive care’, Fertility and Sterility
94 (2010), e1, e121; W. Van Hoof/G. Pennings/P. De Sutter, ‘Cross-border reproductive care
45
for law evasion: should physicians be allowed to help infertility patients evade the law of their
own country?’, European Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology and Reproductive Biology 202 (2016),
101-105; Jackson et al., ‘Learning from Cross-Border Reproduction’,Medical Law Review (2017),
(in press).
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portant are online communities and Facebook groups.46Unwanted childlessness
can be a lonely experience, especially when most of one’s friends appear to be
able to conceive effortlessly; for some patients, virtual online communities can
be an invaluable source of friendship and advice. It is increasingly common for
members of these forums and groups to request information about other
people’s experiences at specific overseas clinics, which other members will an-
swer. Fertility Friends, for example, currently has separate discussion threads
devoted to surrogacy in India, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia and Greece.
It would be impossible to force people to visit a licensed clinic in the UK,
or their GP, before seeking treatment abroad, but it might be possible to encour-
age collaboration between home and domestic providers. If IPs knew that it
was possible to receive parts of the treatment – scans and drugs prior to egg
retrieval, for example – before travelling overseas, there might be an incentive
for them to make contact with healthcare professionals at home. This would
then provide an opportunity for them to receive high-quality and accurate infor-
mation about international surrogacy’s risks and downsides before they make
their arrangements with an overseas agency or clinic. If we cannot stop people
engaging in international commercial surrogacy arrangements, we should at
least make sure that they understand its pitfalls for them and their children, as
well as for surrogates and egg donors.
Healthcare professionals within the UK are not universally well trained in
the implications of surrogacy arrangements. Indeed there is some evidence
that surrogates and IPswithin theUKhave encountered attitudes from clinicians
and other healthcare staff that are at best unhelpful, and in some cases, actually
hostile.47 In their survey of UK fertility clinic staff, for example, Norton et al.
found that 70% believed that surrogacy cases take up ‘excessive amounts of
staff time’, with some staff commenting that the parties to surrogacy arrange-
ments could be ‘very demanding and high maintenance’.48 More training in
surrogacy, and its legal and other implications might enable healthcare profes-
sionals to offer better advice to couples contemplating surrogacy overseas.
It would be possible to provide a more powerful incentive for pre-travel en-
gagement with an official body, such as the courts or Cafcass, if IPs could be
Jeremy Snyder et al., ‘The “patient’s physician one-step removed”: the evolving roles ofmedical
tourism facilitators’, Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (2011), 530-4.
46
See e.g. N. Smith, this issue, at p. 237. Also see The Independent ‘NHS hospitals forcing surrogate
families to hand over newborn babies in car parks due to ‘dire and outdated’ laws’, 29 October
2016.
47
Wendy Norton et al., ‘A survey of UK fertility clinics’ approach to surrogacy arrangements’,
Reproductive biomedicine online 31 (2015), 327-338.
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pre-approved for a parental order before they travel.49 A fast-track mechanism
for the attribution of parenthood from birth would also enable surrogacy ar-
rangements to be scrutinised before a child is conceived, rather than, as happens
at present, scrutiny taking place only after the child has been living with the
IPs for several months.50
In practice, pre-conception approval might work in the same way as pre-
birth orders do in the US and Greece, where the arrangement is ratified in ad-
vance by a court,51 and, unless circumstances have changed, perhaps because
the agreement no longer represents the parties’ wishes, the IPs can then be
registered on the child’s original birth certificate, and be recognised as her
legal parents from birth. For IPs entering into international surrogacy arrange-
ments, a pre-birth order, ratified by a UK court, might enable their child to be
recognised as a British citizen from birth, thus speeding up and simplifying
the processes of obtaining a passport for her and returning to the UK.
Of course, if pre-approval for a parental order was dependent upon proof of
the surrogate’s free and informed consent, it might, in practice, be difficult or
even impossible for UK-based IPs to acquire this information before they travel
overseas.52 If, instead, pre-approval for a parental order simply involved approval
of the IPs as suitable prospective parents for a child born to a foreign surrogate,
on the basis of a report from a Cafcass Parental Order Reporter, this might be
more straightforward. Following pre-approval, once the child has been born,
and proof of the surrogate’s free and informed agreement to relinquish the
child has been registered with the court, a parental order could be issued auto-
matically, without the need for a hearing. In the event that proof of the surro-
gate’s agreement was not produced immediately after the child’s birth, the pre-
approval would lapse and the IPs would be free to pursue the option of a post-
birth parental order, or another mechanism for the transfer of parental respon-
sibility.
E. Jackson, ‘The law and DIY Assisted Conception’, in Kirsty Horsey (ed.), Regulating Assisted
Conception (Routledge, 2015), 31-49.
49
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Conclusion
The case for reforming the law on surrogacy in the UK has
been a strong one for decades. Unlike other types of assisted conception, surro-
gacy has, since 1985, been regulated by a largely ineffective ban on commercial
surrogacy, which in practice just prevents surrogacy agencies from making a
profit from carrying out certain acts in relation to surrogacy, and by criteria for
parental orders which can be avoided, most straightforwardly by not applying
for a parental order at all.
All parental orders need court approval, and parental orders in cases involving
international surrogacy need the approval of a High Court judge. As a result,
surrogacy arrangementsmake profligate use of scarce judicial resources. Rather
than only reaching the court when there is a dispute, or where something has
gone wrong, surrogacy arrangements which have gone smoothly nevertheless
take up a considerable amount of court time, even when, in practice, the court
is effectively rubber-stamping an arrangement that has already been made.
In short, there are two closely related reasons to believe that the case for re-
form of surrogacy law is now overwhelming.
First, the courts consider surrogacy arrangements after the child has been
born, when their paramount consideration must be the child’s welfare
throughout her life. It is therefore impossible for the courts to do anything
other than make whatever order will best protect the child’s interests. In inter-
national surrogacy arrangements, judges can and do repeatedly warn of the
dangers of entering into these agreements without legal advice, but these
warnings come too late, after the child is here. If the IPs are eligible for a par-
ental order, and this would be in the child’s best interests, a parental order will
be granted automatically, on the basis of what is almost a template judgment.
To say that this is an inefficient use of the resources of the Family Division of
the High Court would be an understatement.
It could therefore be argued that courts consider individual surrogacy ar-
rangements, if they consider them at all, at the wrong time, after the child is
born and living with her ‘parents’, by which time, the court will usually have
no choice but tomake a parental order. It would be possible to institute a vetting
process with teeth so that IPs could be pre-approved for parental orders, before
the child is conceived. This could simply be done by Cafcass, or, if necessary,
their recommendation could receive fast-track confirmation from a judge. And,
of course, if there were grounds for concern, a pre-birth parental order could
be refused.
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Of course, in reality, people who were turned down at that point, or who did
not apply for pre-approval could still travel overseas and engage in commercial
surrogacy arrangements. They might then return home with a child whose
legal position will require resolution in the courts. Pre-conception approval for
parental orders will notmake the problem of people bypassing the law disappear.
What it would do, however, is change the default position.
In the vast majority of straightforward surrogacy cases, pre-approval for a
parental order, which then crystallises at birth, could mean that the IPs were
recognised as the child’s legal parents from birth. This would make it easier
for them to obtain a passport for their new baby and return to the UK. It would
be more efficient, as well as more appropriate, if the law’s default position was
better aligned with the reality that the vast majority of surrogacy arrangements
go smoothly and that a parental order will almost always be in the child’s best
interests.
Of course, there will be exceptions to the norm, and there will be surrogacy
cases in which the courts will have to step in, after the event, in order to protect
the child’s best interests.53 Pre-approval for a parental order could be revoked,
if there were grounds to believe that it was no longer in the child’s best interests,
or if the surrogate had withdrawn her consent. But it is surely sensible for court
time to be devoted to cases in which there is a real issue to be decided, or a
dispute to be settled, rather than wasting judicial time by forcing High Court
judges to tick a series of boxes – Was the sum paid disproportionate to reason-
able expenses?Were the applicants acting in good faith and withoutmoral taint
in their dealings with the surrogate mother? Were the applicants' party to any
attempt to defraud the authorities?54 – beforemaking an order that no one could
ever seriously have doubted would be made.
Secondly, the criteria for parental orders themselves would appear to be in
disarray. At least in the case of payments, the UK statute specifically allows for
judicial discretion in order to accommodate the interests of children born as a
result of commercial surrogacy. More striking is the President of the Family
Division’s recent interpretation of another necessary condition for the making
of a parental order, namely that the applicationmust bemade within sixmonths
This might be demonstrated by Cafcass’s finding that, in 154 of 156 cases, the outcome was the
making of a Parental Order; of the remaining two cases, one application was withdrawn, and
53
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See, for example, Theis J. in CH, NM v. SM,MM, X (By His Children’s Guardian) [2016] EWHC
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of the child’s birth.55 There is no similar ‘unless authorised by the courts’ clause
in this provision, and until the case ofRe X (AChild) (Surrogacy: Time limit),56the
courts had assumed that, regardless of whether a parental order might be in
the child’s best interests, the statutory words were clear and unambiguous, so
that no order could be made after the child was six months old.57 Then, in Re
X, Sir JamesMunby P decided that this cannot have been parliament’s intention.
Parliament, he reasoned, ‘must have intended a sensible result’, and ‘slavishly’
sticking to a six-month time limit would not be sensible:
‘Given the subject matter, given the consequences for the commissioning
parents, never mind those for the child, to construe section 54(3) as barring
forever an application made just one day late is not, in my judgment, sensible.
It is the very antithesis of sensible; it is almost nonsensical.’
Unsurprisingly, Re X has been followed by several cases that would have
otherwise been out of time. Although Sir James Munby P used the example of
an application made a day late in order to illustrate his claim that this could not
be what parliament had intended, parental orders have now been granted sev-
eral years later. In Re A (A Child),58 for example, relying upon the judgment in
Re X, Russell J made parental orders in respect of two children, aged eight and
five years old.
The unravelling of section 54 continued in May 2016, in Re Z (A Child)
(No 2),59 a case brought by a single man who was the biological father of a child
born to a surrogate in the US. Three days before the hearing, the Secretary of
State for Health conceded that the prohibition on single people’s access to
parental orders was incompatible with Article 14 of the European Convention
on Human Rights:
‘The Secretary of State accepts that the facts fall within the ambit of Article
8 and that Article 14 is engaged. It is accepted that there is a difference in
treatment between a single person entering into a lawful surrogacy arrangement
and a couple entering the same arrangement. This difference in treatment,
namely the inability to obtain a parental order, is on the sole ground of the
status of the commissioning parent as a single person versus the same person
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s. 54(3).55
[2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam).56
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were he part of a couple. The Secretary of State accepts that, in light of the evi-
dence filed and the jurisprudential developments both domestic and in Stras-
bourg … this difference in treatment on the sole ground of the status of the
commissioning parent as a single person versus being part of a couple, can no
longer be justified within the meaning of Article 14.’
If an eligibility criterion based upon a person’s marital status is discrimina-
tory, could it also be argued that the requirement that at least one of the IPs
must be the child’s genetic parent discriminates unfairly against doubly infertile
couples, whose infertility may be the result of a disability, which, like marital
status, is a protected characteristic for the purposes of the Human Rights Act
1998? If the trumping criterion for the making of a parental order is the child’s
best interests throughout her lifetime, it would surely be sensible for it to be
admitted that this, coupled with the surrogate mother’s agreement to the
making of the order, is the only criterion for eligibility for a parental order, and
that the other restrictions either have been, or are waiting to be rewritten or
ignored in order to protect the child’s wellbeing.
In the past, it was plausible to argue that it would be inefficient to set up a
cumbersome bespoke framework for the regulation of surrogacy, when the
numbers of births each year are so low. While the numbers are increasing,
surrogacy is unlikely ever to become a common way to start a family. Neverthe-
less, the efficiency argument could now be turned on its head. With cuts to the
court service’s budget, and plans to move towards online courts for simple
contractual disputes, it seems extraordinary that international commercial
surrogacy continues to require a full court hearing before a judge in the Family
Division of theHigh Court in order to tick a handful of boxes, that are invariably
ticked because the child’s best interests trump other considerations. Given that
pre-approval of parental orders might also be in the best interests of IPs and
children, by ensuring that neither is left in a legal limbo during the child’s first
months (or now years) of life, there would seem to be no good reason for a
government looking for further efficiency savings in the Ministry of Justice not
to seize the ‘low hanging fruit’ of our expensive, inefficient and ineffective law
on surrogacy.
Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2016-3214
JACKSON
